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Abstract— This E-Tendering systems remain 
uncertain on issues relating to legal and security 
compliance, in which unclear security framework is 
one of the issues. In te current situation, tendering 
systems are lacking in addressing integrity, 
confidentiality, authentication, and non-repudiation. 
Thus, ensuring the system requirements, consider 
security and trust issues has to be regarded as one of 
the challenges in developing an e-Tendering system.  
Therefore, this paper a model of a secured e-
Tendering system using Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) approach. The modelling process begins with 
identifying the e-Tendering process, which is based on 
Australian Standard Code of Tendering (AS 4120-
1994). It is followed by identifying the security threats 
and its countermeasure. The use case approach has 
been proven reliable in determining appropriate 
requirements for handling security issues. Having 
considered that, the outcome of this paper is a 
secured e-Tendering model. The model can guide 
developers as well as other researchers. 
Keywords— e-Tendering, IT Project, Security threats 
and counter measure; misuse case. 
 
1. Introduction 
Tendering refers to the process of choosing the best 
offer for certain needs, through a principle, 
involving a legally binding contract [1, 2]. The 
tendering process involves two parties, (1) 
Tenderer – any party submitting tenders, including 
contractor, subcontractor, and supplier [3], and (2) 
Principal – any party inviting and receiving tenders, 
which may include contractor or subcontractor [3].  
Generally, the process involves four stages; 
announcement of tender lists, submission of tender 
proposals, assessment of the proposals, and 
acceptance of the proposal[3]. However, it could be 
adapted to suit the context.  As an example, 
Australian Standard Code of Tendering [3] 
underlines seven components, which extends the 
general tendering process; registration of qualified 
tenderer, public announcement of tender lists, 
submission of tender proposals, close of tender, 
assessment of tender proposals, award of tender, 
and archival of the tender.  
Now, the tendering process could be carried out 
electronically (e-tendering).  E-tendering translates 
the tendering process into an electronic form. It 
refers to the electronic publishing, in which 
accessing, communicating, receiving, and 
submitting of every information and document are 
carried out via the Internet. This has been proven to 
offer a more efficient and effective process in the 
business, which also reduces cost significantly (NT 
Government; NSW Department of Commerce) [3].  
However, even though there is a significant 
improvement in the e-Tendering over the 
conventional technique, in terms of reduction of 
capital and time, and less reliance on human 
capability [4], it is still lacking and uncertain in 
terms of legal and security issues [5]. In terms of 
this, such systems have vague framework. It was 
also found that transactions are not highly trusted 
and users are not sure of the system’s ownership 
[6,7,8].  When the security is not protected, many 
cases have shown that hacking, pirating, virus, 
fraud, illegal trading, defamatory libel, and money 
laundry have been [9,10,11] negatively impacting 
users’ trust.  As a result, studies need to identify all 
possible threats and determine the most appropriate 
solution so that the e-tendering process secures and 
make users feel confident. 
Not only that, tendering systems also deal with 
transparency, accountability, integrity, corruption, 
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and cronyism issues [12].  This deals closely with 
trust. However, most existing e-tendering systems 
do not address them, leaving such issues 
unattended. As result, it negatively affects the 
utilization of the e-Tendering systems too. Thus, 
studies also need to determine the solutions for 
that.  Therefore, this paper aims to model a secure 
e-tendering system using misuse case approach. 
2. Modeling Process of the e-
Tendering 
 
The modelling process comprises of four phases. It 
begins with identifying the e-tendering process 
(based on the Australian Standard Code of 
Tendering [3]), followed by identifying the security 
threat, and it countermeasures the system. Finally, 
based on the identified secured e-tendering, the 
modelling process commenced using misuse case 
approach. 
 
Phase 1:  Identifying e-tendering process 
E-tendering process by the Australian Standard 
Code of Tendering procedures [3] is almost similar 
to the traditional tender process. It varies only on 
certain procedures for certain particular systems. 
Accordingly, the common features are mapped 
against the general component of the conventional 
tendering process. The outcome of this phase is the 
e-Tendering processes that this study further uses 
as the benchmark in constructing a secured e-
Tendering model. Among the various stages in the 
tendering process, this paper focuses only on public 
invitation and tender submission components. 
 
Phase 2:  Identifying e-tendering security threats 
and countermeasures of the security threats 
Threat is a potential activity that could lead to 
vulnerability of the e-Tendering system [13]. 
Identifying threat is important to ensure such 
system is secured.  It could be done by eliciting the 
security requirements for the system. For this 
study, the elicitation was made through discussions 
in related journal articles on security mechanism of 
electronic application. The threats and secured 
practices listed in a matrix. The matrix of the 
threats and possible security practices are discussed  
in the following section. 
 
Phase 3: Constructing a secured e-Tendering model 
on public invitation and tender submission 
The aim of this phase is to construct a secure e-
Tendering model. Findings from the previous 
phases are used to construct the model. The model 
is based on generic components of e-Tendering and 
security requirements.  The generic components of 
the e-Tendering requirements drive as the basis for 
eliciting the functional user requirements.  
Meanwhile, the security-focused requirements have 
been regarded as non-functional requirements that 
are specified as supplementary specifications. The 
detailed activities for each phase are described in 
the following section. In each phase, a set of related 
UML model has been developed to illustrate both 
process (public invitation and tender submission).  
 
2.1  Finding of the E-Tendering 
Modeling Process 
Equations Table 1 shows the mapping between the 
components of the e-Tendering system and the 
Australian Standard Code of Tendering procedures 
[3]. 
 
Table 1. E-Tendering System Components 
 
Tendering 
System 
Component  
[3] 
E-tendering General System 
Function (Conventional 
Tender Process) 
Registration of 
tenderers 
Pre-registration  
Tenderers are issued with 
password and id. 
Public 
announcement 
of tender  
Advertisement of tender in 
public newspapers 
Tenderer views the tender 
advertisement 
Submission of 
tender 
proposal 
Tenderer registers for the tender 
Tenderer downloads tender 
documents  
Tenderer submits tender 
proposal 
Close of tender Tender is closed 
The principal opens the tender 
proposals 
Tender 
evaluation  
The proposals are assessed  
Principle requests for additional 
information  
Most qualified proposal is 
awarded the tender 
 
Award of 
Tender A formal agreement is signed by 
both parties 
Archiving  Documents are archived 
 
The e-Tendering process in Table 1 is used in this 
study as the benchmark in modelling a secured e-
Tendering system, specifically for public invitation 
and tender submission processes (shaded in Table 
1). The modelling process is detailed in the 
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modelling section. 
 
2.2 Security Threats and 
Countermeasures 
Generally, threats and possible violations comprise 
actions that insecure secured e-Tendering systems.  
That is why they have to be carefully handled. 
Hence, the identification of threat and security 
problem enable this study to define the system 
requirements as well as its security requirements.  
Accordingly, with reference to [14], the 
requirements are listed below: 
• Impersonate - it is common in terms of 
identifying fraud and malicious parties. It is 
dangerous because other parties could have similar 
access to tenderer’s account and do whatever they 
intend. 
• Repudiation - the third party could deny or 
decline any content while communicating, 
especially during tender process. This could dispute 
principal and tender. 
• Confidential violation – sensitive 
information is viewed by unauthorized malicious 
parties. Then, they could notice about the tender 
progress and distort the process. 
• Non-verifiable evidence – in most cases, 
tenderers could make a claim for fair treatment 
when they are unable to meet the tender 
requirements because they do not have access to 
the right information. 
• Denial of service – processing of user 
requests are discarded when technical problems 
happen.  
• Integrity violation - malicious party 
changes, alters or deletes information or document 
submitted by the tenderers or the principle. 
 
The requirements listed above are used in this 
study to determine how they affect the tendering 
process.  Hence, a matrix is come out with, which 
is adapted from Cooperative Research Centre for 
Construction Innovation Technical (CRCCIT).  
Accordingly, Table 2 details the possible threats in 
tendering process along the phases outlined in 
Table 1. 
 
 
Table 2. Possible Threats in Tendering Process 
 
-Tendering 
Phases 
TIV IV CV I NVE DoS R 
Pre-Qualification 
and 
registration  
- Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Public invitation  - Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Tender 
submission 
Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
Close tender Yes  Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
Tender 
evaluation  
- Yes  - Yes - - 
Award of tender - Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Archiving   - Yes Yes - - - - 
Note: ITV-Time Integrity Violation, IV-Integrity 
Violation, CV=Confidential Violation, I-Impersonation, 
NVE-Non-Verifiable Evidence, DoS-Denial of Services, 
R-Repudiation. 
 
Further, Table 3 details the countermeasure for 
the e-Tendering security threats in this study. 
 
Table 3. Countermeasures of the in e-Tendering 
Security Threats based on Non-Functional 
Requirements 
 
Non-Functional 
Requirements 
Countermeasures 
1) Integrity 
(ISO 27000-
Information 
Security) 
To protect the original data 
from manipulation by 
malicious party. The 
integrity property is 
maintained, in which the 
recipient is allowed to 
identify whether the message 
is in original state. It is to 
ensuring the data is genuine. 
Appropriate security tools for 
this include secure sockets 
layer (SSL) for 
communication integrity, 
digital time stamping to 
provide timestamp integrity, 
biometric, and digital 
signature. 
2) Confidential
ity (ISO 
27000-
Information 
Security) 
 
To avoid information leaking 
during communication to 
ensure confidentiality. This 
could be done using 
cryptography encryption. 
3) Data Origin 
authenticati
on [15] 
Allowing the recipient to 
verify the messages to ensure 
they have not been tampered 
in transit and that they come 
from an expected sender. 
This sis possible done using 
proof-of-possion. 
4) Availability 
(ISO 27000-
Information 
Security) 
To ensure only authorized 
parties can have access to the 
data after getting into the 
system. In response to that, 
this study recommends all 
principles to ensure the 
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system is available at all 
time. 
5) Non-
Repudation 
[16,17] 
Is crucial in handling legal 
issues in providing evidence 
to debate or officially accept 
a business transaction. For 
this, the evidences have to be 
at all time available. 
6) System 
Reliability  
[15] 
This requires the system to 
be performing what it is 
supposed to at all time under 
stated conditions. 
 
Having the e-Tendering process, threat and 
countermeasure, and security solution determined, 
the misuse case modelling is constructed as 
discussed in the following section.  
 
2.3 Constructing a Secure e-Tendering 
Model 
This study uses Unified Modelling Language 
(UML) to model the secured e-Tendering model.  
The scenarios described below are used as the basis 
in designing the misuse cases:  
 
Step1: Context and Asset Identification. The 
context of the advertisement and submitting tenders 
process is shown in the use case in Figure 1. The 
figure explains that the Principal will first advertise 
the tender list in public newspapers. It enables 
tenderers to notice the tender availability.  Then, on 
tenderers’ part, they will view the tenders and 
register for the preferred tender, subjected to their 
qualification. Having registered, the system will let 
them (the tenderer) to download appropriate 
documents, including tender specification. At the 
same time, the system will record the registration. 
Eventually, the tenderer has to submit their tender 
proposal before the stipulated date. 
 
Step 2:  Security objective determination. The 
use case in Figure 1 cannot be used to show the 
vulnerable assets and security criteria. It can only 
be used to tell the reason about the security criteria. 
Among the whole process, this paper discusses 
three processes: i) tender submission; 
 
 
Figure 1. Use Case Modeling of the e-Tendering 
(Open Tender Component) 
 
ii) ensuring the integrity of tender advertisement; 
and iii) receiving tender document by the principal.  
This means the submitted tender document cannot 
be changed once the tender advertisement is 
published. 
 
Step 3:  Risk analysis and assessment. Figure 2 is a 
use case for the possible threat modelling in the 
tendering process particularly during the tender is 
being advertised and submitted. The Attacker in the 
use case threats the integrity of the advertisement 
because it could steal principal’s identity. This 
could fake the advertisement. This is a serious 
matter in the process. Accordingly, the tenderer 
may take wrong actions as a response to modified 
information, including late submission.   
 
Step 4: Risk treatment. The use case in Figure 2 
suggests no risk treatment. However, specifying 
appropriate treatments for each particular risk could 
be done through relationship mitigation. 
 
Step 5:  Security requirements definition. Possible 
threats that may attack the tendering process is also 
shown in the use case in Figure 2, which is adapted 
from [18]. However, the security solution is not 
available in Figure 2. Meanwhile, Figure 3 shows 
that each threat has its own mitigation relation. 
This mitigation relation acts as a countermeasure 
for specific threat that can reduce the effect of 
vulnerabilities.  
 
Step 6: Control selection and implementation. Use 
cases suggest no technique for selecting and 
implementing control mechanism.   
 
Tenderer
Principal
Advertise Tender
View Tender Advertisment
Download Tender Specification
Register Tender
Submit Tender Document
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
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Figure 2. Threat Modeling of e-Tendering System 
 
Figure 3. Modelling of Security Requirement of e-
Tendering System 
 
3. Discussion And Conclusion 
This study retains the security and accountability of 
trust as they are emphasized in conventional 
tendering process. Hence, the e-Tendering 
framework that this study proposes is capable to 
deliver the same quality with more efficient and 
effective business process. Based on the 
framework, to cater for the ethical issue, developers 
of the e-Tendering systems should also consider 
technological factors that expose information 
malicious parties to invade or attack the system. In 
particular, the utilization of digital signature could 
curb ethical issues like repudiation in the e-
Tendering system. It is a second layer 
authentication. Obviously, a secured e-Tendering 
system is not enough with a simple cryptographic 
algorithm for document transfer because any 
transacted document cannot be trusted since it may 
come from impersonator. These are only some 
examples of security issues in e-Tendering that 
might require security mechanisms to overcome the 
problem. Without a proper planning, developing 
and maintaining the system might consume high 
cost. Besides that, developers should also consider 
other security issues and threats like integrity, 
confidentiality, non-repudiation, and availability, 
which interrelate among each other and involve 
organizational practice and regulations.  
As a response to that, this paper exhibits the use 
cases that map the security risk in the tendering 
phases and countermeasure in overcoming security 
problems. However, the use cases only showcase 
what malicious parties could do. However, through 
the use of mitigation relationship, it is able to show 
what a user can do or enforce to curb the misdeeds 
by malicious parties. Also based on the use cases, 
developers are able to clarify what happens in the 
e-Tendering system (similarly to the use case 
function) in order to enforce security mechanism in 
a secured e-Tendering system. 
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